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ABSTRACT
This article examines some of the problems and proposed solutions associated
with the retirement of minority members, particularly early retirement within the
Social Security System.
We also discuss the failure of the Reagan administration's 1981 attempts to
change social security benefits.
Introduction
Among the many problems that the aged face upon retirement is a sharp reduction
in income. Since the primary income source for most of the aged is Social Security,
this problem is exacerbated for the aged poor, and especially for the minority group
members among them. During their work/income-producing years, the poor have held
lower-paying or non-pension jobs. Upon retirement they receive less in the way of
cash payments than the general public. Since they earned less during their working
years, had larger families, and were forced to spend more of their incomes for goods
and services, they were less able to accumulate savings for their retirement years.
Because of the kinds of work available to them, they were limited in joining and
receiving benefits from private pension and tax-sheltered retirement plans.
Some critics claim that with a life expectancy seven years less than the gene-
ral population, the non-white aged poor lose two ways (Gilfix, 1977). They cannot
earn enough to draw larger Social Security payments and they die sooner. Addition-
ally, Social Security tax is based upon wages earned. No allowances are made for
the number of dependents or other usually allowable tax deductions. Thus, the
Social Security tax falls most heavily upon those least able to afford it, since it
takes a larger portion of their income than it does from those able to evade this
form of taxation. Another problem is that the kinds of work the minority/poor
engaged in were largely not covered by Social Security (i.e., farm work or domestic
help, sometimes as illegal aliens). It will be some time before these people will
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be able to secure enough "good years" to be eligible for substantial increases in
coverage.
In spite of efforts made to correct inequities in Social Security benefits,
there remains a significant lag behind whites in the amounts that poor blacks and
other minority/poor will be able to draw from the system for some time to come.
Among workers newly entitled to Social Security benefits, two-thirds of the black
men and nearly 90% of the black women were concentrated in the lowest economic
category and received no second pensions (Thompson, 1974; Rubin, 1974). Adding
the inability of minority/poor children to contribute to the financial support of
their elderly parents because of their own low income and need to provide for
larger families, the problem is again exacerbated.
Under a private pension system, although the individual has to die before sur-
vivors are eligible to draw from it, arrangements are made to inherit pension
monies and other savings. Under the Social Security System, the early mortalities'
families lose all contributions except for a small burial allowance. There are
other payments available to survivors, but these are also affected by prior work-
ing time and income. Minority families are less likely to receive a private pen-
sion. Private pension plans are the most regressive of all social welfare
measures because of their links to employment stability, seniority, and upper-
echelon personnel positions.
The Issue of Life Expectancy
An even more serious complaint, if it were true, is that minorities are being
discriminated against not only in living but in dying. The contention is that
minorities age and die sooner than whites and, therefore, receive benefits for a
shorter period of time, if at all. Michael Gilfix (1977:137) argues that:
An Anglo of 60 may have a life expectancy and support needs of a
black who is 52 or an Indian person who is 40. Age averaging - the race-
blind process of addition and division - has convinced our social planners
that "most" Americans live past age 65. They are convinced that in any
event, most elders will benefit from aging programs with an eligibility
age of 60, such as the Older Americans Act. They overlook the fact that
material differences exist in life spans between the major races.
The solution that Gilfix suggests to this inequity is to allow minorities to
retire early because of "relative aging." He states (1977:137):
Pursuant to this concept, for example, blacks would be eligible for
income and support for elders at age 55. Spanish-speaking persons might
be eligible for them at age 52 and Indian people at age 40. Each eligi-
bility age would be determined by a combination of factors to include
aveage life expectancy and availability of alternative services.
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While it is true that at birth these minorities do have a lesser life expec-
tancy, the real problem is in living long enough to retire. Once minority members
reach retirement age their chances of living as long as their white birth cohorts
are good (See Table 1). A study of life expectancy in California for the years
1969-1971 revealed that at age 65 Spanish surname and black men have greater life
expectancies than anglo men; at age 65 black and anglo women have equal life expec-
tancies and that of Spanish surname women is only .3 of a year less. Other nation-
wide studies have also shown little or no life expectancy disadvantages for blacks
who reach age 65 (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1974). The
fallacy that critics of the uniform retirement age make is to confuse differences
in life expectancy at birth with differences at older ages. The differences at
birth are substantial because of substantial differences in infant mortality.
After infancy the mortality rates become progressively more similar.
TABLE 1
Life Expectancy, by Sex and Ethnicity, California, 1967-71
Expectancy of Life at Age
GROUP 0 15 40 65
Males
Spanish surnamed 68.3 55.4 33.4 14.4
Anglo 68.7 55.5 32.5 13.6
Black 63.5 51.3 30.5 14.5
Females
Spanish surnamed 75.2 62.1 38.3 17.4
Anglo 76.0 62.4 38.6 17.7
Black 71.5 58.9 36.3 17.7
Source: Robert Schoen and Verne E. Nelsen, "Mortality by Cause Among Spanish
Surnamed Californians, 1969-71," Social Science Quarterly, 62 (2), 1981:
259-274.
We have noted several real or imagined shortcomings of the Social Security
System, however, many criticisms of Social Security ignore the philosophy
which, for better or worse, is behind the program's design. Before considering
remedies for the Social Security System's ills, let us examine this philosophy.
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Philosophy of the Social Security System
From its very onset, Social Security was never designed to meet all income
needs of the aged. Its philosophy was to try to avoid the need for the stigma of
a "means test." It was not meant to be equitable or, despite the word "insurance,"
intended to be financially sound in the sense of a client's premiums covering the
costs of payments to the client and his or her family (Schlesinger, 1958). The
state of the nation's economy has repeatedly been an important factor, it influenced
the form in which the Social Security Act was passed and has affected the manner in
which it has been administered (Perkins, 1964).
More importantly, because the law was passed at a time when the country's
economy was going through one of its sharpest slumps, the program aimed toward
pushing people out of the labor market. So, earned income was discouraged. On the
other hand, the politics surrounding Social Security have repeatedly surfaced.
From the very beginning, conservative forces wished to keep the workers' contribu-
tions at a low level to reduce employers' matching contributions.
In our society, poverty and incapacity for self-support are always stigmatized
and carry with them status loss. One of the reasons that Social Security has been
a "sacred cow" almost beyond criticism is that it has been associated with work.
While you worked, you "payed into" the fund. When you reached the "golden years"
you could, as a matter of right, draw from the pot. Not even attempts by the
Federal Government to bar a well-known Communist from receiving his Social Security
payments were supported by the Federal Courts (this during the heyday of McCarthyism).
On the other hand, attempts to enforce in court the "right" to poor relief or
welfare have not always been successful. This is evident in the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling against the "right" of the poor to force the states to pay for abortions:
logic would dictate that an unwanted child would result in a greater cost to the
state than an abortion, especially adding the long-run social and economic costs.
Looking behind the stated reasons why large sectors of the public express
disapproval of the welfare system is interesting. For example, very few people are
angry at programs for the blind since everyone can sympathize with them and it
affects all sectors of our society. When considering General Assistance or AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) programs, however, the reverse is true.
Who could have predicted that the struggle for widows' pensions or the recommenda-
tions of the 1919 White House Conference on Child Welfare would eventually result
in such a universally acceptable goal falling from grace to disgrace? As programs
moved more and more to serve the poor, the less they were seen as serving the needs
of all.
Minimum income plans proposed by conservative President Nixon to eliminate
the incredible welfare mess were rejected. The Senate refused to consider any
program which ignored the work ethic, no matter how well it was disguised or who
proposed it. When those states and cities that tried to humanely deal with these
and other welfare problems came close to going bankrupt, their plight was attributed
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to either welfare fraud or governmental mismanagement. The reality---that some
parts of the nation exported their surplus populations to other states and cities---
was ignored. New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts are now paying for the
failure of many southern states and Puerto Rico to properly educate and prepare
their populations for responsible entry into a highly technological society.
We must never underestimate man's capacity to distort reality to suit his own
self-interest. Any plan to correct inequity or unfairness in the Social Security
System must consider not only the historical context, but also the value laden
aspects of the problem: "Work is good. Not to work is bad." These are the views
which obstruct changing the Social Security System. Retirement benefits were to
be earned as a right, not to be given in response to need. It was designed with
built-in inequities. Social Security is now openly called a tax rather than a con-
tribution.
The Social Security System and the Reagan Administration
It is apparent that the Reagan Administration's attitude toward welfare and
Social Security is rooted in a conservative philosophy. Services for those who are
not "truly needy" are to be eliminated. Even services for poor children, the elderly
poor and the working poor are to be curtailed wherever possible. When cuts in
social services result in the poor being hurt, volunteerism is supposed to step in
and ease the pain.
However, in spite of the relative ease with which Reagan was able to push
through sharp cuts in social services budgets (National Association of Social
Workers News, 1981), he encountered considerable difficulties in trying to reduce
the Social Security program. In the first major cuts from the Carter budget, the
Reagan forces in Congress succeeded in eliminating the minimum monthly payments of
$122.00. However, under pressure from the senior citizen's lobby the Reagan admin-
istration asked for the restoration of these minimum payments (Associated Press,
1981a). Subsequent attempts to raise the age of retirement were defeated in the
House Ways and Means Committee (Associated Press, 1981b).
There appear to be two reasons why the Reagan administration has succeeded in
cutting the budget of social service programs in general, but not the Social Security
System budget. First, although many social service programs are regarded by the
public as wasteful and fraud ridden, the Social Security System benefits are regarded
as a right the participants have bought through the "contributions" deducted from
their paychecks. Second, although blacks and other minority groups with high poverty
and unemployment rates are overwhelmingly Democrats and can be ignored by Republicans,
the elderly are an essential cornerstone in the Reagan power base (Germond and
Witcover, 1981). It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Reagan administration will
successfully spearhead legislation which greatly reduces services provided by the
Social Security System. A more probable scenario is that the Reagan Administration
will "reluctantly" accept increases in the rate of social security withholdings so
that the system does not become bankrupt. The Democrats are more likely to propose
using general tax revenues.
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Potential Changes in the Social Security System
While large numbers of the minority/poor are destined to draw less income from
the Social Security Program for previously stated reasons, with increased movement
to urbanized areas (blacks are among the most highly urbanized population groups
in the country), their incomes are increasing and their jobs are coming more under
the coverage of Social Security and private pension plans. This, coupled with the
converging life expectancy among all ethnic groups, should eventually serve to
markedly reduce the present inequities in the Social Security System.
To ask the country as a whole to address itself to a problem of inequity is
to open a Pandora's box which, at this time, might just as well be left closed.
The Social Security tax is one of the most regressive forms of taxation. It allows
no one except the very rich to escape it. Recent publicity about the dangers of
the entire system going bankrupt and the subsequent need for sharp increases over
the next few years have made this a very sensitive issue with a larger and larger
portion of the population.
There is no doubt that those who formulate social policy need to address them-
selves to the question of equity and the needs of the aged poor. Any major changes
in social policy, however, have to consider not only the recipient, but also who
will pay for redistribution. The decision can be based upon political pressure
or through demonstrating that the needs of a large group are not being met. Those
groups that can exert the most political pressure and make themselves heard above
the "roar" of the rest will be responded to. The decision to allocate resources
can often be based upon compassion or popularity of the cause. Minorities have
been "in." Aged are now also "in." Combining both groups, you would appear to
have a winner. The latent consequences, however, may be more than bargained for,
particularly when society as a whole is being told it can no longer continue to
perceive of itself as ever-expanding, with an unlimited capacity to create and
deliver more and more goods and services. It may very well serve to bring together
a majority who see themselves threatened by unreasonable demands from a special
group.
Wilber Cohen argued:
that in the United States, a program that deals only with the poor will
end up being a poor program. There is every evidence that this is true.
Ever since the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, programs only for the poor
have been lousy, no good, poor programs. And, a program that is only
for the poor---one that has nothing in it for the middle income and
upper income groups---is, in the long run, a program the American pub-
lic won't support (Cohen and Friedman, 1972).
Changes in social policy that ignore or run counter to the central values and
beliefs of society, no matter how rational the solution, can have unforeseen con-
sequences possibly more harmful than the original problem. Most certainly, asking
for major changes in the Social Security law to rectify a relatively small
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differences in life expectancy at age 65 would not be well received at a time when
the Social Security tax has been increased and the public has been told repeatedly
that the entire system may be bankrupt.
To ask, at this time, that one group be allowed to withdraw from the work
force at an earlier age when, within the foreseeable future, the total contributing
number remaining will diminish, invites a great deal of resentment. Appearing to
be pushing to the head of the line invites hostility from those who have been sen-
sitized by higher rates of forced contributions and the danger of the system going
bankrupt.
Conclusions
The resolution of this problem now becomes the question. Shall we allow cer-
tain groups of people to retire at age 55? An examination of life expectancy
tables show that once the minority members arrive at age 55, their life expectancy
is close to their white chohorts. This solution also does not meet the real income
needs of minority/poor aged, as their pension rates would still be lower due to
lower prior contributions. The aged minority members would be forced to stop work-
ing to receive their full benefits, and the plan would again not eliminate or meet
their need for supplemental income. Should this group be singled out and provided
with special supplemental income on the basis of need? What about the needs of the
non-minority aged poor? This would bring the problem back to the question of a
"means test." It would be ironic if some members of the working poor escaped the
welfare stigma all their lives, only to be caught up in it in their old age when
their self-concept has begun to decline for other reasons. We suspect many would
shun this form of help, as many elderly now do.
Another problem is how to bring about a change in ideology so as to be able
to bring about a change in the Social Security System. This may be more difficult
than changing tax laws and bringing about changes in income redistribution through
other programs.
Shall we tax minorities at a lower rate during their working years? How would
this be received by others who are paying full rate and see their payments increa-
sing? Should income received while on welfare be credited? This could backfire.
It still would not address itself to parts of the real problem. In order to
increase retirement payments, greater amounts (in the form of contributions) have
to be made during the working life of the minority/poor. The solution seems to be
better paying jobs, more access to jobs with private pension plans and greater
income so "savings" can be accumulated for retirement. Perhaps another ideologi-
cally acceptable alternative would be to allow low income persons to deduct from
their income tax an amount equal to what they place in a private retirement plan.
This would be different from present Keogh plans which deduct money from gross
income, in that the deduction would be from actual taxes due. These solutions,
however, do not address themselves to the time lag during which the minority/poor
would still suffer from their years of unemployment, underemployment, low salaries
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